Mawbima News

By Rajiva Wijesinha –

Enemies of the President’s Promise &#8211 Chapter 2 – Satisfied Component 4

Underlying Basil’s solipsism was his political ambition. He created no bones about the fact that he saw himself as his brother’s successor. Indeed, he had been put into Parliament ahead of the 2010 election, although a resignation of a National List member that was engineered, on the grounds that there had to be a Rajapaksa accessible for appointment as President if anything untoward occurred to the incumbent. And although quickly soon after the election of 2010 Mahinda Rajapaksa introduced a constitutional amendment to get rid of term limits, so that Basil’s hope of becoming observed as necessarily the government candidate in the subsequent election was dashed, the President placed no restrictions on him presenting himself as successfully the principal choice maker in government.

So, in addition to his function in the North, he set about taking handle of developmental projects all over the country. Tourism was brought beneath the Ministry of Financial Development, which allowed him quickly after the government was formed to sell a prime block of land in Colombo to Shangri-La hotels, a crass measure since it created it difficult afterwards to refuse outright ownership to such investors. Fortunately, following a great outcry, the principle that only extended leases need to be permitted was accepted, but again the move was standard of Basil’s propensity to push through bargains speedily, regardless of wider consequences.

While he utilized to the full his position as patron of international ventures, he also tried to take manage of the administration of the country at huge. He did this through the Samurdhi programme, the welfare programme that was in place all more than the nation. Initially began to market entrepreneurship, it had quickly grow to be the primary car of government handouts to selected sections of the population.

Basil decided to use it to expand his empire, with graduates employed in each Division in the nation to affirm the primacy of his Ministry. Certainly I was told that there had even been an try to appoint Samurdhi officials as Grama Niladharis, the office that was the 1st point of interaction among folks and government. The Ministry of Public Administration staved off this effort, but it meant that for several years Grama Niladhari positions that were vacant have been not filled, until finally that Ministry reasserted its control of the position. Certainly a measure of Basil’s unpopularity with his colleagues was the categorical statement, when I told the Minister that he must guard against his responsibilities being encroached upon, that the Ministry of Economic Development was encroaching on everything.

Such encroachment could have been initiated in a civilized manner, because it could be argued that financial development was of the essence in all regions. But clearly with Basil it was power that he sort, rather than coordinated efficiency, for he took no steps to make certain that officials in related fields worked with each other. Therefore there were no clear systems to make certain coordination between the Grama Niladharis and the Samurdhi Improvement officers, and later the Financial Improvement officers, who have been assigned to each GN Division.

Although certainly they worked collectively, they did not have recommendations about ensuring consultation of the neighborhood and liaising with other government departments. Numerous of them told me, for the duration of the Divisional Secretariat Reconciliation meetings I had in the North and East, that they had been collecting data, but what this data was for, they seemed to have no notion. They had received quite small education just before getting appointed, and even though the Ministry of Defence put on a leadership development programme for some of them which was significantly appreciated, they have been not clear about their terms of reference, nor the way in which they could coordinate function with other government agencies. A programme of preparing reports, and making sure follow up for suggestions primarily based on people’s needs as properly as their recommendations, was not place in place, which was a pity considering that this was the first occasion on which the more than-worked Grama Niladharis had been provided qualified help employees to help with developmental work.

A single region in which guidelines have been laid down formally led to issues which had unfortunate consequences for the nation. Amongst the initiatives of Basil’s Ministry was a rural improvement programme referred to as Divineguma for which he introduced an Act which the Supreme Court ruled was in violation of the Constitution, in that it took away from the monetary authority of Parliament. Basil was furious when the judgment was delivered. In truth the Court recommended a basic way of overcoming the constitutional issue, and government realized that the recommendations created sense, and the Act was effortlessly passed as amended. But the bitterness Basil had evinced recommended that he was 1 of the chief factors in the animosity the government felt towards the Chief Justice, which led to her getting impeached.

Given Basil’s undoubted abilities and energy, it was a pity that he saw himself as mainly a politician. Patronage became much more important than development, and he reinforced the concept that politicians need to make a decision on priorities, as when for instance the Ministry asked Members of Parliament to advocate disused fields that ought to be recommissioned. This should far more practically have come by way of consultations at village level, but that would have not won any brownie points, whereas providing economic support to locations chosen by politicians was much more beneficial in terms of escalating political capital.

This element became really preposterous when, in 2014, Basil decided that development projects must be the purview of Members of Parliament. Previously every single member of Parliament, which includes those in the opposition, was allocated what was termed a decentralized price range of Rs 5 million a year. This could be utilised generally at will, although there have been recommendations laid down and approval had to be obtained for proposals from the Ministry of Financial Improvement.

Then it was decided to give another Rs 30 million to selected government Members. The rationale for leaving other individuals out seemed to be that these folks chaired what were termed Divisional Improvement Committees. But in reality, when I brought the matter up at the Consultative Committee on Public Administration Reforms (to the consternation of the Minister, who stated I would get him into trouble) it was noted by a government Member that the point was to give them funds for patronage in the whole District in which they would be contesting. This was a consequence of the absurd electoral technique we had, whereby contestant, even though technically allotted constituencies, had to seek votes all through the District.

But evidently 30 million each and every was deemed inadequate, and the next step was to allocate hundreds of millions to pick Members. So in Trincomalee a single Member go over 600 million, and an additional more than 200 million. Some had been offered absolutely nothing, which led to vociferous protests, which led in turn to the Member who felt most difficult completed by becoming created a Deputy Minister, prior to Provincial Council elections in Uva, for which his support seemed crucial.

While some Members did consult the people and feel carefully about how these funds should be spent, other folks simply did what they wanted, and some undoubtedly ensured that they would benefit from commissions on what ever they undertook. Buildings therefore became critical, and little consideration was paid to training wants or business improvement.

But clearly improvement was seen as secondary to political popularity. And to make things worse, given that Basil was in Parliament, and observed as the major political agent of the loved ones, the President entrusted not just development activity to him, but also areas which he did not recognize at all. Therefore, early in the life of Parliament, he presented proposals to adjust the electoral method for neighborhood bodies, which were utterly incoherent. When ideas have been made for improvement, he declared that decisions had currently been created, and the Act would be introduced as drafted. But so numerous amendments were required when the Act came before Parliament, that it had to be withdrawn. When it was lastly reintroduced many months later, it was with a guarantee that it would be amended later to get rid of certain absurd provisions. Amongst these for instance was a clause that a distinct percentage of candidates may possibly be girls or young folks. Lumping each groups together, and then not making their involvement mandatory, was typical of an strategy that did not see principles as an integral element of politics.

With electoral considerations getting his priority, Basil was slow about what was significantly far more crucial, reform of Regional Government structures. This was planned, and a bill was drafted, but it was kept on the back burner. The Secretary to the Ministry, 1 of the brighter government officials, shared the draft with me after the Minister had consulted me about the electoral amendments. I discovered then that the consultation with the grass roots that the President had wanted had been perverted to introduce only nominees to the committees that have been to be established. Ironically this replicated the colonial mindset, where representatives of the folks had been nominated rather than elected. This principle had been opposed by Sri Lankans searching for political reform, so it was sad to see the paternalistic concept getting reintroduced.

There was no alter in this provision in the subsequent draft I saw, although I was gratified to see that some at least of my suggestions seemed to have been taken up. But that meant practically nothing given that the Bill lay forgotten as government moved into election mode with the decision to advance the date of the Presidential election. The Liberal Celebration did create to the President suggesting that he not waste the remaining years of his mandate, but as an alternative move on measures he had promised, and which had been in preparation for a number of years, for instance with regard to Education and Higher Education and Electoral and Local Government Reform. But the appeal fell on deaf years, as Basil began to set up electoral offices, with scant regard for the leadership of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which had not been consulted on the matter.

Basil’s wider political role may possibly not be strictly germane to the gradual erosion of the hopes the nation had in the Rajapaksa government to promote peace and prosperity, in particular in the former conflict regions. But it needs to be recorded in view of the possibilities lost because of his lack of concern for national priorities. The failure to strategy coherently for the North, with certain reference to human resource development, was a single of the principal factors for the continuing bitterness of its citizens towards government. And the refusal to seek the advice of the folks was unbelievably callous in the context of a lately concluded conflict. That demanded assurance as to the primacy of the men and women of the area in government planning, but Basil had neither the wisdom nor the commitment to give this.

By Granville Perera –

It is time that all those who think in the ideals of the Sri Lanka Freedom Celebration (SLFP) instantly gather about any opposition candidate who would genuinely perform towards abolishing the executive presidency and save the future of the SLFP.

Those who fail to act now will comprehend that a 3^rd Term for Mahinda Rajapaksa would make certain that Gota will succeed him and the baton would be passed on to Namal and there is no hope for any in the SLFP to climb up the ladder of executive workplace for the subsequent twenty 5 years or far more. What would be the fate of the SLFPers who have toiled all their lives to bring the celebration back in to energy, specially surviving the iron fisted rule set in motion by the late cunning fox – J R Jayewardene and the UNP rule of 17 years that disfranchised Madam Bandaranayike. These days, the old guards of the SLFP are confined to the old peoples home tagged as “Senior Ministers” and their future in politics systematically destroyed.

A notable and possibly the most corrupt soon after the Rajapaksa clan – Nimal Siripala de Silva was removed from his lucrative ministry of health and shoved to Irrigation and Mahaweli development to ensure that he would not be a future presidential competitor with his ill-gotten wealth. Now, when he is settling down to continue his corrupt practices, he has been brought down to earth with the debacle in Uva through the crafty use of Dilan Perera to attack him that ensured his electorate defeat.  The entire blame for the mediocre overall performance in Uva has been placed on Nimal Siripala in private discussions with the president. His file is already at the bribery commission in case of any attempt at defection. This has ensured that Nimal Siripala has been reined in and will not harbor any believed of sleeping with the enemy for worry of losing almost everything.  Maithripala on the other hand is one particular stubborn mule who nevertheless holds on, and a carrot of premiership has been provided, but Maithripala knows better.  Gota will be the next prime minister, ought to Mahinda get his three^rd term. If there is enough numbers that would cross over to the opposition along with Chandrika and Maithripala, the man from Polonnaruwa will turn out to be the obvious option for the frequent candidate. In such a situation, how will the UNPers vote? Would they trust the SLFPer? Much more importantly, will the Sajith clan accept Maithripala? Will Ranil genuinely contemplate supporting? The million dollar query would be – will Maithripala be happy in a non-executive presidency?

What ever the decision that the old guard of the SLFP take will make or break the SLFP. Should they support an opposition candidate to defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa, they have the opportunity of constructing a coalition to challenge the UNP in the parliamentary elections that would stick to which could elect a government that would be answerable to the parliament. With the divided UNP, it is the SLFP that stands the most significant chance of forming a effective alliance. The JVP too would be far more inclined to help a SLFP coalition than one led by the UNP whom they nevertheless think about as traitors since of Ranil’s peace procedure with the LTTE.

The only selection left for Ranil is possibly to assistance fielding the most capable common candidate and get him elected so that he has the chance of becoming a strong premier. Never ever in his dreams must he entertain the thought of contesting Mahinda Rajapaksa as he is a brand that can not be marketed. Most would admit that Ranil is greatest suited to steer the nation out of the financial mess that has been the hallmark of the SLFP, but an individual else need to win the election for him.

The crisis with the JHU has exploded beyond the expectations of the Rajapaksa clan. Pavithra is no spring chicken to blurt out corruption charges on Champika Ranawaka out of the blues. It was Basil’s strategy to rein in Champika and the JHU to help the Rajapaksa third term which entirely back-fired due to the amateurish handling of it. What ever kickbacks that came Champika’s way from the contracts was not taken by him, but was taken more than by the JHU which was in deep monetary crisis. This was with the full approval of His Excellency Mahinda Rajapaksa.

The self proclaimed Mr clean who ditched Chandrika and sought refuge in USA claiming her to be the Chaura Rajina (Queen of deceit), Dullas Alahapperuma is almost certainly the schemer for the Rajapaksas. His capability to hold throwing stones at absolutely everyone displaying his huge grip almost certainly has cost Mahinda Rajapaksa his 3rd term. With Maithripala packing his bags and Wasantha Senanayake set to go, the flood gates would soon open, and then it would be as well late for Mahinda to withdraw in to his presidential cocoon. There is no 1 to blame but himself for creating his own down fall.

By W.A Wijewardena –

Driving down CCPI through administrative measures

When the annual enhance in the price of living of typical consumers in Colombo and suburbs declined from three.5% in September to 1.six% in October 2014, the Central Bank could not hide its joy. In its press release on Inflation in October, the Bank has said that ‘inflation has declined significantly in October’ (obtainable at: Inflation declines significantly in October).

In additional elaborating this claim, the Bank has stated that “Inflation, as measured by the change in the Colombo Consumers’ Value Index (CCPI) (2006/07=100), which is computed by the Division of Census and Statistics, decreased from 3.5 per cent recorded in September 2014 to 1.six% in October 2014, on a year-on-year (YoY) basis, which is the lowest considering that November 2009”.

The downward revision of the ‘electricity tariff by 25% supported by comparable reduction in costs of LP gas, petrol and diesel’ by means of administrative decisions by the government in the last two months have been the primary motives for this decline in the price of living, according to the Central Bank. Because the products beneath reference together with rent on homes and water bills have a high weight of 24% in CCPI, even a minor reduction in the costs can result in a substantial fall in the all round CCPI worth in a specific month.

Hence, even though there was a marginal enhance in the food and non-alcoholic beverages in October, such improve could not influence the general index value regardless of it has a share at 41% in the index. Yet, the total expenditure which a customer has to incur in order to get the basket of goods and solutions in CCPI has improved, according to values provided by Division of Census and Statistics or DCS, from Rs. 49,259 a year ago to Rs. 50,070 in October 2014. However, the expenditure on this basket in September 2014 amounted to Rs. 50,881 and therefore there is a slight easing of the cost of living in October 2014.

The reductions in electrical energy tariff and the rates of power are not repeatable each and every month. Therefore, a repeat overall performance of this beneficial outcome in the coming months is unlikely.

Can the Central Bank be pleased about the development?

Ought to the Central Bank be happy about this improvement? For two causes, it ought to be a tiny far more restrained in expressing its happiness. One particular is that it does not go along with the Central Bank’s co-objective of ‘economic and cost stability’. The other is that it portends a larger extended term dilemma now know as ‘lowflation trap’.

Central Bank’s new mandate is to have both economic and price stability

Let’s now turn to the initial issue. In an amendment accomplished to the Bank’s governing legislation recognized as the Monetary Law Act in 2002, the Bank’s objective of maintaining a steady common price level in the economy was re-designated as ‘economic and value stability’. This is somewhat peculiar due to the fact in all other central banks, it is just maintaining price stability. Why this was accomplished in the case of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka was explained in detail by this writer in a preceding report in this series beneath title ‘Central Bank’s Mandate is to attain each financial and cost stability’ (offered here ).

The broadening of the mandate to economic and price tag stability was due to the foresight of the then Governor of the Bank, A.S. Jayawardena, popularly identified as AS. When the Globe Bank, IMF and even this writer were opposed to the particular term, AS had a simple but a very cogent explanation. He mentioned that what a central bank must seek to attain is the stability in the general macroeconomy and not a mere price index. Simply because, according to him, a cost index can be manipulated to record a slower development via value controls, subsidies or mere price tag reductions carried out administratively. Such measures will certainly ease the burden of expense of living. But they will not assist a central bank simply because these actions develop imbalances elsewhere creating it difficult for a central bank to attain its objective of maintaining a stable economy.
The purpose of adding the term ‘economic’ is, therefore, to remind the future central bankers that they ought to not be content about a mere decline in the consumers’ price index. They need to be satisfied only when such decreases have come from the monetary policy actions taken by the Bank without generating imbalances elsewhere in the economy.

Reduction of rates of loss makers creates concerns for the fiscal sector

The present reductions in electrical energy tariff and rates of LP gas, petrol and diesel by means of administrative measures do not fall in line with the above financial wisdom. Except LP gas, the other three item supplying companies in Sri Lanka are running at a enormous loss as documented by the Committee on Public Enterprises or COPE in its current reports to Parliament. Accordingly, the cumulative losses of the electricity supplier, CEB, during 2011-13 had amounted to Rs. 47 billion and these of the fuel supplier, CPC, had amounted to Rs. 193 billion.

These losses have to be recouped by the Treasury by raising funds either by means of increased taxation or by borrowing. What the Treasury has done in the past to make good these losses is to situation particular Treasury bonds to these institutions which the public has to repay on a future date by paying much more taxes or foregoing existing public services. Thus, there is already an imbalance in the fiscal sector of the nation. Therefore, the present cost reductions involving loss-creating public enterprises and thereby worsening the fiscal imbalance are not a development about which the Central Bank could be happy if it follows its mandate properly.

Lack of credit development despite inducements

Sri Lanka has knowledgeable a deceleration in the growth of its customer value index, CCPI, from around late 2009. The long term inflation shown by this deceleration became a single digit quantity and that single digit number also started falling over the years. What is shown as 1.six% growth in CCPI in October 2014 for the duration of the final 12-month period is the lowest worth of the single digit number ever recorded in the final five years. Responding to the decline in the single digit number, the Central Bank commenced relaxing its monetary policy with an announced objective of supporting the government’s economic growth initiatives. This was completed in a number of rounds in diverse forms.

Credit expansion in the economy was promoted explicitly by the Central Bank by releasing a substantial amount of money which industrial banks had to keep with the Central Bank as a compulsory reserve – recognized as the Statutory Reserve Requirement or SRR – in July 2013 by lowering the necessary ratio from 8% to 6%. The quantity so released was about Rs. 590 billion which if banks had employed for credit expansion would have generated added loans of Rs. two,950 billion by about December 2014.

But this did not occur. Credit to private sector elevated only by Rs. 21 billion among July 2013 and July 2014. In reality, credit to public corporations declined by Rs. 37 billion more than this period. Even the lending to government by commercial banks did not increase appreciably it improved only by Rs. 53 billion after the changes in government deposits with industrial banks are netted off. Despite the reported high financial growth of over 7% during this period, naturally the private sector did not wish to utilise bank credit for financing their activities.

As a result, in a desperate attempt to push credit to the economy, the Central Bank commenced lowering interest prices by cutting its rate on excess money deposited by commercial banks from 7.5% to 6.5%. Typical fixed deposit prices of industrial banks fell from 12.38% in October 2013 to 8.09% in October 2014. Amongst September 2013 and September 2014, the average lending rates of industrial banks fell from 15.52% to 12.98%. Regardless of the cut in interest prices, industrial bank credit flows to the economy did not improve by the magnitudes by which they ought to have elevated. It just appeared that the fall in lending prices of commercial banks was not a enough inducement for borrowers to raise funds from banks.

A country in a lowflation trap

This predicament evidences that Sri Lanka is caught up in a ‘lowflation trap’, a malaise at present being seasoned by EU countries. When the inflation price comes down sharply and holds at those low levels for some time, there ought to be a faster reduction in lending prices to produce a decline in true lending prices – the necessity for inducing borrowers to use bank credit.

When the average inflation rate was at 23% in 2008, the typical lending prices of commercial banks were about 20%, yielding a damaging actual lending price in the economy on typical. It is a substantial inducement for borrowers to borrow. But when the inflation rate fell, lending rates of industrial banks did not fall in the identical style. Accordingly, when the typical inflation price was around 7% at end-2013, the average lending rates of commercial banks stood at 15%. The actual interest rates in terms of these numbers had been substantially optimistic at about 8% – certainly not an inducement for borrowers to seek funds from industrial banks. By September 2014, on the insistence of the Central Bank that industrial banks must reduce their lending rates, the typical lending rate fell to about 13% but inflation had fallen much more sharply to 3.5% by that time. Therefore, the actual interest rate had increased to 9.5%.

In October 2014, the situation has turn into a lot much more vital: Inflation rate has fallen further to 1.6% escalating the true lending rates to over 10%. In this situation, banks can not be blamed for not giving loans to clients because consumers have no incentive to seek bank credit at higher true interest prices.

To reduce or not to reduce interest rates?

If inflation rate remains under three% over the next two to 3 years, Sri Lanka can not get out of the lowflation trap unless it cuts its interest rates drastically by about five to 6%. This signifies Central Bank’s standard deposit price need to be about 1%, its common lending rate around two%, 1-year Treasury bill rate around two%, commercial bank deposit prices about three% and industrial bank lending prices about 6%. But that will produce severe imbalances across the economy thereby frustrating Central Bank’s try at attaining each financial and cost stability. It may possibly solve a issue in 1 area but it might generate many far more troubles in other regions. In other words, an artificially driven-down inflation rate will not help the Central Bank to preserve macroeconomic stability across the economy.

A low interest rate regime at around the levels talked about above is not feasible in Sri Lanka due to three factors.

CCPI numbers coming out of a black box

In the first spot, there are issues about the credibility of the inflation numbers released by DCS. Considering that the entire approach of preparing CCPI is not topic to a post-audit verification by a technically competent authority, the numbers are just released by DCS from out of a black box. What is taking place inside the black box is not visible to anyone. For instance, in October 2014, one particular of the reasons adduced for the decline in CCPI has been the so known as reduction in electricity tariff. But the actual electricity bills received by consumers for the month of October did not show such a reduction. In the case of this writer’s monthly electricity bill, per unit tariff for 200 units had enhanced from Rs. 21.25 in September 2014 to Rs. 23.91 in October 2014.

It is not clear no matter whether DCS had taken into account the actual electricity bills paid by the group of buyers represented in CCPI – the very first 80% of the expenditure units in Colombo and suburbs – or just gone by the announcement made by the government. Therefore, the ordinary public appears to be harbouring the belief that the CCPI numbers released by DCS are far from reality.

In such a scenario, the demand for greater wages, salaries, allowances and fees can’t be avoided. A lot of of the reliefs provided to the public in the Price range 2015 – enhance in the salaries of public servants, requesting the private sector do the very same, increase in the Mahapola scholarship allowances, payment of a special subsidy to senior citizens on their savings with banks – have been created in recognition of the elevated cost of living in spite of the deceleration in inflation price as calculated by DCS.

Artificially-low interest rates will worsen the external sector imbalances

Second, if inflation numbers are not realistic, the reduction in interest prices will certainly discourage savings and induce consumption and for that matter, the consumption of imported goods. This is shown by the higher registration of motor vehicles in the current previous, specifically motorbikes where much more than 1,500 motorbikes are registered per working day. Hence, a low interest rate regime is like providing a blank cheque to somebody as far as consumption and imports are concerned. Regardless of the deceleration in the growth of imports and better overall performance in exports, this year’s trade deficit is probably to be around $ 8 billion. Thus, a blank cheque by way of lowered interest prices will worsen the current imbalance in the external sector requiring the nation to borrow more to fill the gap.

Low interest prices not great for foreign hot income

Third, Sri Lanka has relied on foreign hot money to build its foreign reserves by permitting foreigners to invest in higher yielding government paper. Such funds, amounting to $ 3.5 billion as at end October and accounting for about 40% of total official foreign reserves, have been attracted by Sri Lanka primarily by supplying greater yields on government securities when in the home nations of these investors, the maximum yield receivable has been about 1%. This incentive will be narrowed and ultimately be unfavorable if Sri Lanka reduces its interest prices to a low level. In such a scenario, the outflow of these funds can not be avoided worsening the existing imbalance in the external sector. It will put stress on the rupee to further depreciate with adverse consequences on Sri Lanka’s future development plans.

In view of the lowflation trap in which Sri Lanka is now caught, the decline in the price of growth in CCPI is not a development about which the Central Bank can be content at all.

W.A. Wijewardena, a former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, can be reached at [email protected]

A important member of the Opposition United National Party on Friday urged Media Minister Keheliya Rambukwella to unblock Colombo Telegraph, claiming that it offers views of a broad section of society and not news.

UNP MP Dr Harsha de Silva has created this request for the duration of his speech in parliament on the budget. He mentioned that the curb on media freedom has resulted in a number of internet sites being utilised to market news and views.

Earlier in the day, Media Minister Rambukwella denied there were attempts by the government to curb media freedom in Sri Lanka. Another UNP MP Sujeewa Senasinghe mentioned that several journalists have been forced to flee the nation out of fear.

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History of Colombo Telegraph blocking

Very first -December 26, 2011 – We are blocked but we will not be stopped

Second – May 8, 2012 – Colombo Telegraph Blocked Once again

Third – March 29, 2013  – Sri Lanka Blocks Colombo Telegraph and Selected Tweets: Colombo Telegraph Unblocked

Fourth – August 23, 2013 – Colombo Telegraph Blocked, How To Reach Us Now: Sri Lanka Telecom And Mobitel Joins The DPI Club!

Other attempts 

October 26, 2012 – Colombo Telegraph Was Hacked

August 9, 2012 ColomboTelegraph Password Cracking Try Blocked

Freedom Residence Report: Freedom On The Net 2012, Sri Lanka Is A Country At Threat

By Tisaranee Gunasekara –

“Negligent, ambitious, and perverse Princes are the real causes of public misfortunes.” – D’Holbach (Excellent Sense Without having God)

This month, a female university-entrant fell off a seven-foot wall and suffered spinal injuries[i], even though participating in the Leadership Coaching Programme in an army camp.

The military spokesman says the wall was just six feet high. Let’s think him.

What sort of ‘leadership training’ entails jumping from a six-foot wall? Armed robbery? Kidnapping? Movie stunts?

What is the logic of herding students into army camps and forcing them to engage in mindless and useless pursuits which have no place in a normal law-abiding civilian existence?

The leadership education programme is a close to best symbol of Rajapaksa pondering and Rajapaksa governance. It is unnecessary, does no good to anyone and senseless virtually to the point of insanity. It has not achieved any of its stated aims. The execrable practice of ragging continues the only distinction is that freshers get ragged twice &#8211 by the military as nicely as by seniors. (The Leadership Education Programme may broaden the sadistic horizons of future raggers, teaching them more degrading, hazardous and inhuman ways to torture the next batch).

The Leadership Education is a waste of everyone’s time and everyone’s money.

But it will not be scrapped due to the fact it is a brainchild of Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Scrapping the programme would be akin to admitting that the Rajapaksas can make blunders, which violates a essential maxim of Rajapaksa rule – Rajapaksa infallibility.

The leadership instruction programme also provides a clear warning of the future awaiting Sri Lanka, if Mahinda Rajapaksa wins a third term.

Mahinda is not just Mahinda. Mahinda is Basil and Gotabaya, Namal and Shashindra, siblings, nephews, nieces, cousins and in-laws. And acolytes, always acolytes, those pawns empowered and glorified for 1 crowded hour &#8211 or two. There will usually be Sajin Vass Gunawardanes, Sampath Chandrapushpas, Duminda Silvas and Mervyn Silvas (and their sons) and Galagoda-Atte Gnanasaras. The Rajapaksas cannot rule without them.

Is this the future we want?

This is the future we will have, if Mahinda Rajapaksa wins a third term.

Mahinda Rajapaksa defeated the LTTE. He did not do so alone but let that be. Is defeating the LTTE a logical cause to give him a third term, understanding what he and his brothers did in the second term?

Make Mahinda Rajapaksa a gazetted national hero. Give him all the accolades and statues his megalomanic heart craves for. Rename every public facility following him. Make his birthday a national vacation. Have an annual parade honouring him. But do not give him a third term, so that he can institutionalise familial rule and render dynastic succession inevitable.

It is only in fairy tales that the monster-slayer gets the country as a reward. This is actual life.

Mahinda Rajapaksa is indubitably a friendly man. Fine set up a Mr. Conviviality award and give it to him every single year. But that is not a good adequate reason to vote for him, realizing what he will do and what he will enable his brothers, relatives and acolytes to do.

Mahinda Rajapaksa cannot defend national sovereignty. He is in the method of turning Sri Lanka into a Chinese protectorate. Mahinda Rajapaksa cannot create peace. He has failed to reconcile the Tamils whilst antagonising the Muslims and the Christians.

The only way Mahinda Rajapaksa can defend territorial integrity is by igniting another unnecessary war with an additional minority and winning it – right after a number of much more decades of bloodshed and mayhem.

Mahinda Rajapaksa’s thought of development is to create expressways, airports and ports, although ordinary folks like, his personal Sinhala-base, sink into greater want.

Do we want the Rajapaksas – and that means all the Rajapaksas, not this or that Rajapaksa, simply because theirs is a loved ones business – to rule this nation for at least six a lot more years?

Do we want Gotabaya Rajapaksa in parliament, poised to step into his brother’s presidential shoes, legally and constitutionally?

Do we want a entirely degraded judiciary? Do we want judges who are manifestly the pawns of the rulers?

Do we want the new Rajapaksa commonsense to grow to be hegemonic? Do we want impunity, abuse and corruption to turn out to be the only normal the next generation of Lankans know?

Do we want the militarization of economy, civil society and our minds? Do we want a morality which despises the weak and worships the powerful and the effective?

Do we want a nation which can’t defend its most vulnerable (children and the elderly) even as it spends most of the national wealth on defence?

Do we want an acolyte-capitalism and a serfocratic administration, a nation exactly where Dhammika Pereras rule the economy and Sajin Vaas Gunawardanes thump Chris Nonises?

Do we want a nation where advancement and security depends on slavish obedience to Rajapaksas?

Do we want Sri Lanka to grow to be a battleground of regional and international powers?

Do Sinhalese want a lasting peace or a new war with one more minority?

Do Tamils want to live under de facto occupation, a life of worsening humiliation, powerlessness and insecurity?

Do Muslims want to grow to be the new Tamils?

Do Christians want to live like second class citizens?

Dislodging the Rajapaksas will not solve all Lankan troubles. But the absolute majority of Lankan difficulties can’t be solved without dislodging the Rajapaksas.

The Final Trapdoor

Defeating the Rajapaksas becomes an uphill job with every single passing year. Not due to the fact the Rajapaksas turn into far more well-known, but because the Rajapaksas make the politico-electoral playing field much more uneven, from within.

But economic discontent is growing, specifically among the Sinhalese (as the CPA survey reveals). That provides the opposition a trapdoor of opportunity, a decent opportunity of pushing the election into a second round. For the opposition, an outright victory is not necessary preventing an outright victory by the Rajapaksas will suffice because it can result in a political tsunami, such as within the SLFP.

If the Rajapaksas win the presidency, they will move swiftly to neutralise the most efficient figures in the opposition. As soon as the opposition is reeling from attacks, arrests, calumnies and internal squabbles, the parliamentary election can be held. When a Rajapaksa occupies the PM post, the Achilles Heel of familial rule will be no far more.

Life has not improved for Tamils and Muslims during the second Rajapaksa term. But has life turn into much better and happier for the Sinhala majority during the second Rajapaksa term? The Sinhala-South may possibly not be interested in the atrocities committed throughout the war and in the aftermath. They may possibly be indifferent to Tamil and Muslim problems and fears. But has the situation of the Sinhala-South enhanced for the duration of the second Rajapaksa term? Are Sinhalese greater off socio-economically, a lot more safe and much more hopeful about the future than they were in 2010? Are they satisfied about the path in which the Rajapaksas are taking the nation? Are they willing to sacrifice the fundamental rights they take so much for granted and the prospect of a far more peaceful and prosperous future, for the sake of a dead or an unseen enemy?

The Rajapaksas will attempt to muddy the waters of our thinking by screaming about Tigers and Jihadists, traitors and conspirators, so that we forget the actual situation.

Do we want a Rajapaksa future?